Padilla v. Kentucky: The Criminal Defense Attorney’s Obligation to Warn of Immigration Consequences of Criminal Conviction by Sykes, Nicole
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 3 Spring 2012 Article 15
March 2013
Padilla v. Kentucky: The Criminal Defense
Attorney’s Obligation to Warn of Immigration
Consequences of Criminal Conviction
Nicole Sykes
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicole Sykes, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Criminal Defense Attorney’s Obligation to Warn of Immigration Consequences of Criminal Conviction,
28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. (2013).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss3/15
	 891
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY’S OBLIGATION TO WARN 




Abigail is a resident of Georgia.1 She immigrated to the United 
States and became a lawful permanent resident seventeen years ago.2 
She married a United States citizen, and the couple now has three 
children.3 Abigail’s life took a devastating twist recently when the 
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated 
deportation proceedings against her for shoplifting a pack of 
cigarettes.4 She committed the crime over ten years ago and entered a 
guilty plea after consulting with a defense attorney.5 Under Georgia 
law, she received First Offender treatment and the judge sentenced 
her to twelve months confinement, suspended.6 Unfortunately, 
Georgia’s First Offender treatment does not translate into federal 
immigration law and her plea constitutes a conviction.7 When Abigail 
applied for citizenship, DHS noted her conviction and initiated 
removal proceedings against her.8 If Abigail’s attorney had advised 
																																																																																																																																
 J.D. Candidate, 2012, Georgia State University College of Law. Special thanks to Carolina Antonini 
for her constant guidance and support and to John and my family for all of their encouragement and 
love. 
 1. This scenario was taken from an article written by Grace Sease and Socheat Chea with minor 
changes made to the facts. See Grace A. Sease & Socheat Chea, The Consequences of Pleas in 
Immigration Law, 6 GA. B. J. 24, 24–27 (Oct. 2000). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-60 (2006) (permitting the court, upon a plea of guilty, to defer 
proceeding and place a defendant who has never been convicted of a felony on probation or sentence the 
defendant without entering a judgment of guilt). 
 7. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006) (defining an alien’s plea of guilt and some form of court-
ordered punishment as a “conviction” even if “adjudication of guilt has been withheld”). 
 8. Sease & Chea, supra note 1. Because Abigail was convicted of a theft offense and sentenced to 
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her that her plea would adversely affect her ability to apply for 
citizenship or remain in the United States, she may have never 
pleaded guilty.9 
In Georgia, the courts recognize a noncitizen’s claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel when an attorney makes an affirmative 
misrepresentation as to the immigration consequences of a 
conviction or a plea.10 If Abigail had asked her attorney whether she 
would face adverse immigration consequences and he had responded 
in the negative, the court might vacate her judgment. The Georgia 
Supreme Court, however, does not recognize a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel when an attorney fails to inform a client of 
potential consequences on the client’s status.11 If Abigail’s attorney 
had never asked if she was a citizen and Abigail had never inquired 
into the possible immigration consequences, the court might uphold 
the judgment.12 
Other circuit and state courts have recognized this distinction 
between affirmative misrepresentation and a failure to inform,13 with 
																																																																																																																																
twelve months confinement, her offense is defined as an aggravated felony. Id. As a lawful permanent 
resident convicted of an aggravated felony, she is not eligible for a waiver and her only relief from 
deportation is withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture. Id. 
Unfortunately, these forms of relief have a very high threshold that most applicants cannot meet. Id. 
 9. See Sease & Chea, supra note 1, at 27. 
 10. Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796, 798 (Ga. 2004) (holding that claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel that arise from an attorney’s affirmative misrepresentation to immigration consequences of 
criminal activity must be determined by the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington); see Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 11. Rollins, 591 S.E.2d at 797–98 (finding that the habeas court “erred by failing to distinguish 
between a lawyer’s failure to inform his client of the collateral consequences attending a guilty plea and 
the affirmative misrepresentation of such consequences”). 
 12. See NORTON TOOBY, TOOBY’S GUIDE TO CRIMINAL IMMIGRATION LAW: HOW CRIMINAL AND 
IMMIGRATION COUNSEL CAN WORK TOGETHER TO PROTECT IMMIGRATION STATUS IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 7 (Kerrin Staskawicz ed., 2008) (emphasizing that attorneys must ask every client whether the 
client is a noncitizen because a “client with a name like Peter Jackson who speaks perfect colloquial 
American English and appears Caucasian may turn out to be a citizen of Canada who has lived here 
since he was two years old”). 
 13. United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25–28 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting the defendant’s claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to advise him of his plea’s immigration 
consequences); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (adopting the rule that 
“counsel’s failure to advise the defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise to 
the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance” (quoting United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 
768 (11th Cir. 1985))). But see State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004) (holding that the 
defendant’s counsel had an affirmative obligation to determine the defendant’s immigration status and 
advise him on the immigration consequences resulting from his plea). 
2
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some courts finding that even affirmative misrepresentation does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.14 The United States 
Supreme Court recognized this inconsistency and sought to correct 
this disparity in Padilla v. Kentucky.15 In this case, the Supreme 
Court rejected the distinction between affirmative misrepresentations 
and a failure to inform and found that noncitizens facing criminal 
charges have a right to know that these charges may negatively 
impact their immigration status.16 
In Abigail’s situation, Padilla v. Kentucky would require that her 
attorney not remain silent as to her possible immigration 
consequences;17 however, the extent of her attorney’s obligations and 
responsibilities remains unclear.18 The majority mandated that 
counsel has the “duty to give correct advice” when immigration law 
is “truly clear,” and furthermore even if “the law is not succinct and 
																																																																																																																																
 14. Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985) (declining to hold that 
counsel’s affirmative misrepresentation “in response to a specific inquiry by the accused which results 
in a plea of guilty necessarily constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel”); Commonwealth v. Padilla, 
253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008) (concluding that counsel’s “act of advising appellee incorrectly 
provides no basis for relief” because immigration consequences of a conviction are outside the ambit of 
the Sixth Amendment). 
 15. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (“[D]eportation is a particularly severe 
‘penalty.’” (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1983))). See Nina Totenberg, 
High Court: Lawyers Must Give Immigration Advice, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 31, 2010, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125420249 (“[Benita] Jain, of the Immigrants 
Rights’ Project, notes that deportation for an immigrant who’s been here since childhood can mean 
being deported to a country where the individual has no family left, where he or she may not speak the 
language, and may not know how to ‘get a job, a house or even order a meal.’ And for some immigrants 
granted asylum here, deportation may return them to a country where they risk persecution.”). 
 16. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484 n.11 (“[W]ere a defendant’s lawyer to know that a particular offense 
would result in the client’s deportation and that, upon deportation, the client and his family might well 
be killed due to circumstances in the client’s home country, any decent attorney would inform the client 
of the consequences of his plea.”). 
 17. See id. at 1483. “Lack of clarity in the law, however, does not obviate the need for counsel to say 
something about the possibility of deportation, even though it will affect the scope and nature of 
counsel’s advice.” Id. at 1483 n.10. 
 18. See id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s opinion “has no logical 
stopping-point”); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (Fall 2010) (asserting that the rationale of Padilla should 
extend to other severe consequences of conviction and that this expansion of counsel’s obligations 
“represents sound public policy”); Margate Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The 
Right to Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 34 CHAMPION 18, 22 (May 2010) 
[hereinafter Love & Chin, The Right to Counsel] (“The biggest question mark about Padilla, and its 
greatest potential for systemic impact beyond the immigration context, lies in its extension to indirect 
legal effects of a plea other than deportation.”). 
3
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straightforward,” an attorney still has the obligation to “advise a 
noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of 
adverse immigration consequences.”19 Yet, the Supreme Court never 
defined “competent” for the purposes of determining effective 
assistance of counsel or even how far a criminal defense attorney 
must investigate into a client’s immigration status.20 
Part I of this Note will initially discuss the noncitizen’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim under the Strickland test21 and the two 
prongs a defendant must satisfy to raise a successful claim.22 This 
Note will then delve into the Padilla v. Kentucky case and the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that criminal defense attorneys cannot 
remain silent as to the immigration consequences resulting from a 
plea or conviction of criminal charges.23 Part II will analyze the 
complex nature of immigration law and the difficulty in applying 
Padilla’s “truly clear” test in order to determine whether counsel has 
an obligation to advise a client of the adverse immigration 
consequences of a plea or conviction.24 Part III will propose that 
defender offices establish a comprehensive service plan so defense 
attorneys can confidently provide their noncitizen clients information 
and advice about the immigration consequences of a plea or 
																																																																																																																																
 19. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. 
 20. See Love & Chin, The Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 22–23 (“The Padilla decision will 
greatly expand the responsibilities of defense lawyers in counseling and advocating for their clients, and 
give impetus to a trend toward ‘a more holistic and comprehensive model of representation.’” (quoting 
Robin Steinberg, Supreme Court Ruling Speaks of a New Kind of Criminal Defense, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Apr. 5, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robin-steinberg/supreme-court-ruling-
spea_b_522044.html)); see also, e.g., TOOBY, supra note 12, at 8 (“Some clients will conceal noncitizen 
status in the mistaken belief that—as noncitizens—they would not qualify for public defender 
services. . . . Other clients may honestly believe they are U.S. citizens, since all their brothers and sisters 
automatically became citizens when both parents naturalized, but the client was the only one who did 
not because s/he was married, over 18, or not a lawful permanent resident at the time of the parents’ 
naturalization. . . . Counsel must, therefore, not accept a client’s statement s/he is a citizen without 
careful verification.”). 
 21. Under the Strickland test, a convicted defendant who claims that his counsel’s assistance was “so 
defective as to require reversal of a conviction” must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient 
and that this performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 22. See infra Part I.A. 
 23. See infra Part I.B. 
 24. See infra Part II.A–C. 
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conviction.25 This will ensure that both noncitizens and the State can 
use pleas to their benefit.26 
I. THE EXPANSION OF THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
CLAIM FOR NONCITIZENS 
A. The Strickland Test and Georgia’s Approach to Noncitizens’ 
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel.27 For a noncitizen to bring an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim and vacate a conviction or plea, the 
noncitizen must meet both prongs of the Strickland test.28 A 
noncitizen must initially prove that “counsel’s performance was 
deficient” to satisfy the first prong.29 Then the noncitizen must show 
that the attorney’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”30 
If a noncitizen cannot meet both prongs, the court will deny the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.31 
																																																																																																																																
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
 27. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (emphasizing that “‘the right to counsel is 
the right to the effective assistance of counsel’” (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
n.14 (1970))); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense.”). 
 28. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (addressing the meaning of the “constitutional requirement of 
effective assistance” and declaring that the “benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel’s conduct . . . undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process . . .”). 
 29. Id. at 687–89 (concluding that a defendant must show that his counsel’s conduct “fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness” and that scrutiny “must be highly deferential” to counsel’s 
performance). 
 30. Id. at 687. The Court mandated that the standard is “a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 
 31. Id. at 687, 699–700. The Court held that the defendant failed to meet both prongs of the test 
when his counsel made the choice to argue extreme emotional distress and rely on the defendant 
accepting responsibility for his crime. Id. at 699. Counsel’s unsuccessful choice resulted from 
“reasonable professional judgment,” and there was no probability that omitted evidence would have 
changed the sentence imposed. Id. at 699–700; see also Roe v. Florres-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000) 
(finding error in the court of appeals’ “per se prejudice rule” because it evades the requirement that 
counsel’s error “must actually cause the forfeiture of the appeal”: if the defendant cannot establish that 
but for the counsel’s error the defendant would have timely appealed, the defendant is not entitled to 
5
Sykes: Padilla v. Kentucky: The Criminal Defense Attorney’s Obligation t
Published by Reading Room, 2012
896 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:3 
	
The Georgia Supreme Court recognizes that noncitizens have a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel but limits the claim to when 
counsel affirmatively misinforms the client.32 In Rollins v. State, the 
petitioner pled nolo contendere to a charge of driving under the 
influence and pled guilty as a First Offender to a Georgia Controlled 
Substance Act violation.33 Before pleading guilty, Rollins, a native of 
Barbados, received her attorney’s assurances that the pleas would not 
have any adverse consequences on her immigration status or her 
desire to become an attorney.34 Following these pleas, Rollins earned 
four degrees, including a Juris Doctor degree; passed the Florida Bar 
Examination; and received an offer of employment from the state as 
a prosecutor.35 Despite her success, the Florida State Bar received a 
copy of her guilty plea and held in “abeyance its decision whether to 
admit Rollins to the practice of law,” and the Department of 
Immigration and Naturalization Services instituted deportation 
proceedings against her.36 
The Georgia Supreme Court, in considering Rollins’s claim, 
emphasized that while a defendant has a right to trial and effective 
assistance of counsel, that constitutional obligation does not extend to 
collateral consequences such as deportation proceedings.37 The 
																																																																																																																																
relief); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985) (affirming the district court’s decision to deny a hearing 
for the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the petitioner failed to satisfy the 
prejudice prong of Strickland when he alleged that, absent counsel’s error, he would have pleaded not 
guilty and gone to trial). 
 32. Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796, 798 (Ga. 2004). The Georgia Supreme Court held that the two-
prong test of Strickland must apply to noncitizens’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel when 
noncitizens allege that counsel affirmatively misinformed them as to the consequences of their guilty 
plea. Id. The court permitted the petitioner to withdraw her plea because her case involved the 
“affirmative act of giving misinformation to his client” in contrast to a case in which counsel “failed to 
inform his client of the collateral consequences.” Id. at 798–800. 
 33. Id. at 797. The state discovered trace amounts of cocaine on a dollar bill in Rollins’ purse. Id. 
She denied any knowledge of the cocaine and claimed she had no idea why it was on the money. Id. 
However, because she did not deny the bill came from her purse, on the advice of counsel she entered a 
guilty plea. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. Rollins earned an associate degree from Clayton State College and a double-major bachelor’s 
degree from Georgia State University. Id. 
 36. Id. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the functions of the Department of 
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. This Note will refer to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) since the Act abolished the INS. 
 37. Rollins, 591 S.E.2d at 798 (citing Williams v. Duffy, 513 S.E.2d 212 (Ga. 1999); Thompson v. 
6
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defendant establishes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
regarding collateral repercussions only when he proves counsel gave 
erroneous advice or information.38 The Georgia Supreme Court 
overturned the habeas court’s decision only because counsel 
affirmatively assured his client she would not suffer negative 
consequences from her plea.39 
Georgia courts do not recognize that noncitizens have a 
constitutional right to know all of the collateral consequences of their 
pleas or convictions.40 The Georgia Code, however, statutorily 
requires courts to “determine whether the defendant is freely entering 
the plea with an understanding that if he or she is not a citizen of the 
United States, then the plea may have an impact on his or her 
immigration status.”41 While the statute does not address counsel’s 
obligations to their noncitizen clients, the statute demonstrates the 
nexus between pleas and a noncitizen’s status and emphasizes the 
necessity of noncitizens understanding the consequences to maintain 
																																																																																																																																
Greene, 462 S.E.2d 747 (Ga. 1995)). The Supreme Court of Georgia maintained that “there is no 
constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of collateral consequences in order for her guilty 
plea to be valid.” Id. at 797–98; see also Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and 
Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent 
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 678 (2008) (defining collateral consequences as consequences “that 
result from some law or regulation that takes the fact of conviction into account in deciding whether to 
impose the particular consequence”). 
 38. Rollins, 591 S.E.2d at 799. The defendant’s counsel failed to perform basic research about the 
effects of a plea on deportation proceedings and state bar fitness. Id. Therefore, counsel’s representation 
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. Id. 
 39. Id. at 798. See State v. Patel, 626 S.E.2d 121, 122–23 (Ga. 2006) (affirming the order to permit 
the defendant to withdraw his plea because the defendant had inquired about the impact of a plea on 
payors—such as Medicare and Medicaid—and his medical practice, and his counsel “expressly advised” 
his plea would not result in any “long-term adverse consequences” on his practice). 
 40. Christina Hendrix & Olivia Orza, No Second Chances: Immigration Consequences of Criminal 
Charges, 13 GA. B.J. 27, 27 (Dec. 2007). 
 41. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-93(c) (2010) (“[T]he court shall determine whether the defendant is 
freely entering the plea with an understanding that if he or she is not a citizen of the United States, then 
the plea may have an impact on his or her immigration status. This subsection shall apply with respect to 
acceptance of any plea of guilty to any state offense in any court of this state or any political subdivision 
of this state.”). This law applies to all courts in Georgia, including municipal courts. Sease & Chea, 
supra note 1, at 24. Courts should ask every defendant whether he is a citizen of the United States. Id. If 
the defendant is a noncitizen, the court should ask whether he understands that the plea may impact his 
immigration status. Id. A court’s failure to inquire into the defendant’s status and his understanding may 
result in a future habeas corpus petition on the grounds that the defendant did not enter in the plea 
knowingly or voluntarily. Id. 
7
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the integrity of the plea.42 The legislature, in requiring courts to 
instruct noncitizens of potential immigration consequences, 
acknowledged the growing immigrant population and the 
approximately 900,000 foreign-born individuals living in Georgia.43 
B. Padilla v. Kentucky 
The Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky44 addressed a situation 
similar to the scenario in Rollins. The petitioner, Jose Padilla, had 
been a lawful permanent resident for the previous forty years and 
served in the Vietnam War.45 Before pleading guilty to the 
transportation of a large amount of marijuana, counsel advised him 
that he “did not have to worry about Immigration Status since he had 
been in the country so long.”46 As a result of this drug conviction, the 
defendant was placed in removal proceedings.47 The Court granted 
certiorari to address whether, as a matter of law, a noncitizen’s 
counsel has an obligation to advise him that pleading guilty would 
result in his removal from this country.48 The Court agreed with the 
																																																																																																																																
 42. See Hendrix & Orza, supra note 40 (noting that the Georgia legislature “recognized the 
importance of informing defendants of the consequences of guilty pleas” and amended the Georgia 
Code to instruct courts to determine that noncitizens understand that a plea may impact their status). 
 43. Migration Policy Institute, Georgia: Social and Demographic Characteristics, MPI DATA HUB, 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/state.cfm?ID=GA (last visited Aug. 3, 2011). In Georgia 
between 2000 and 2009, the foreign-born population grew from 577,273 to 920,381. Id. Compare this 
59.4% change in Georgia’s population to the national level, where the foreign-born population grew 
from 31,107,889 to 38,517,234, a 23.8% change. Id. In Georgia from 2000 to 2009, the number of 
persons who obtained legal permanent resident status has increased from 14,707 to 28,396. OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS 16 tbl.4 (2010). 
 44. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 45. Id. at 1477. 
 46. Id. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)). 
 47. Id. at 1477 n.1 (“[V]irtually every drug offense except for only the most insignificant marijuana 
offenses, is a deportable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).”); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
(2006) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or 
regulation of a state, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other 
than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is 
deportable.”). 
 48. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla’s petition for relief 
because it held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right does not extend to “collateral” consequences 
of a plea or conviction. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485). Counsel’s erroneous 
advice or failure to inform regarding removal proceedings did not provide Padilla with a basis for relief. 
Id. 
8
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petitioner that “constitutionally competent counsel” would have 
advised him that his guilty plea would make him subject to amenable 
deportation.49 
1. Removing Deportation from the Collateral Consequences Label 
and Placing It Within the “Ambit of the Sixth Amendment Right to 
Counsel”50 
When the Kentucky Supreme Court heard Mr. Padilla’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel argument, the court denied his claim because it 
concluded that advice regarding the risk of deportation is only a 
collateral consequence.51 Collateral consequences are not defined in 
federal or state statutes but are repercussions of criminal activity that 
“stem from the fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of the 
court.”52 The Kentucky Supreme Court held that while a defendant 
has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that right does not extend to 
collateral consequences of a plea or conviction.53 Therefore, an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on an attorney’s 
incorrect advice about immigration consequences has no 
constitutional relief.54 
The United States Supreme Court noted that many courts similarly 
distinguish between direct and collateral consequences but failed to 
determine whether that distinction is appropriate under Strickland.55 
																																																																																																																																
 49. Id. The Supreme Court did not grant Padilla’s relief, because it did not determine whether his 
counsel’s erroneous advice prejudiced his defense enough to meet the Strickland test, but instead 
remanded his case. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1482. 
 51. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485; see Roberts, supra note 37, at 689 (“[T]he lower 
courts have developed three different, and largely unsatisfactory, definitions of a ‘direct’ consequence: 
(1) whether the consequence is ‘definite, immediate and largely automatic’; (2) whether the 
consequence is punitive; and (3) whether the consequence is within ‘the control and responsibility’ of 
the sentencing court.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 52. Roberts, supra note 37 (quoting Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 
86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634 (2006)). 
 53. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485. 
 54. Id. (“In neither instance [counsel’s failure to advise or advising incorrectly] is the matter required 
to be addressed by counsel, and so an attorney’s failure in that regard cannot constitute ineffectiveness 
entitling a criminal defendant to relief under Strickland v. Washington.”). 
 55. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (“Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not 
consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.”). 
9
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Instead the Court noted that the “unique nature of deportation” made 
it difficult to “classify as either a direct or collateral consequence.”56 
The Court reasoned that it was “‘most difficult’ to divorce the 
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context” and 
concluded that most noncitizens also will find it difficult to separate 
deportation that results from a conviction from the conviction itself.57 
While the Court agreed that deportation is not a criminal sanction but 
is civil in nature, it found that deportation “is nevertheless intimately 
related to the criminal process.”58 After dismissing the “direct” and 
“collateral” label for removal proceedings, the Court refused to 
categorically remove it from the “ambit of the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel” and overruled the Kentucky Supreme Court’s 
decision by determining that the Strickland analysis should apply.59 
2. Deportation Proceedings and the Criminal Defense Attorney’s 
Obligation 
In determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient—the 
first prong under Strickland—the Supreme Court looked to the 
professional norms that guide criminal and immigration attorneys.60 
The Court concluded that the “weight of prevailing professional 
norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding 
																																																																																																																																
 56. Id. at 1481–82. In discussing the nature of deportation, the Court emphasized that federal law has 
expanded deportable offenses and eliminated discretionary relief for many offenses. Id. at 1479–81. In 
1990, Congress eliminated the procedure known as judicial recommendation against deportation that 
had permitted the sentencing judge to recommend that the government not deport an alien. Id. at 1480. 
The Supreme Court noted that if a noncitizen commits a removable offense, his removal “is practically 
inevitable” and the Attorney General no longer has the authority to exercise equitable discretion except 
for particular classes of offenses in which he may cancel removal. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) 
(2006)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (2006) (declaring that an alien who commits an aggravated felony 
“shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable”). 
 57. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); 
accord Hendrix & Orza, supra note 40, at 32 (“Defendants convicted of certain crimes face possible 
removal and, in some cases, complete banishment from the United States. Upon removal, these 
defendants are separated from their families and may face persecution upon return to their countries.”). 
 58. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481. 
 59. Id. at 1482; see Hendrix & Orza, supra note 40, at 32 (“Noncitizen defendants facing criminal 
charges in the United States are guaranteed certain constitutional rights, such as the right to enter a 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea and the right to effective assistance of counsel. To a non-citizen, a 
knowing and voluntary plea should encompass the knowledge that, by entering a guilty plea, he or she 
may be accepting life-altering immigration consequences.”). 
 60. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
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the risk of deportation.”61 In analyzing the petitioner’s claim, the 
Court concluded that his counsel could have easily determined that a 
guilty plea to a drug offense would make him deportable, but instead, 
his counsel falsely told him his conviction would not have an effect.62 
Using the petitioner as an example, the Supreme Court explained a 
defense attorney’s obligation and mandated that when the 
“deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the 
duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”63 For instances in which 
the law is “unclear or uncertain,” the Court stated that a defense 
attorney “need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that 
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration 
consequences.”64 The Court concluded that in the petitioner’s 
situation, the terms of the immigration statute were “succinct, clear, 
and explicit in defining the removal consequence” and therefore 
easily satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test.65 The Court 
																																																																																																																																
 61. Id. The Court looked to standards such as the National Legal Aid and Defender Association’s 
Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation and the America Bar Association for Criminal 
Justice’s Prosecution Function and Defense Function. Id.; see Brief of the National Ass’n of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) 
(No. 08-651) (hereinafter Brief of the National Ass’n). The National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association (NLADA) guidelines “underscore that competent . . . counsel” must consider immigration 
consequences throughout “all stages of the process.” Id. NLADA guidelines accounted for immigration 
consequences such as the possibility of deportation at the initial interview stage, the plea bargaining 
stage, and the sentencing stage. Id. Contra Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[W]e 
must recognize that such standards may represent only the aspirations of a bar group rather than an 
empirical assessment of actual practice.”). 
 62. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006)) (“Any alien who at any 
time after admission has been convicted of a violation (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or 
regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other 
than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is 
deportable.”). 
 63. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. Although the Solicitor General asked the Supreme Court to hold that 
Strickland applies to a noncitizen’s claim only when his counsel provides erroneous advice, the 
Supreme Court rejected limiting its holding to “affirmative misadvice.” Id. at 1484. The Court reasoned 
that limiting a claim to only situations where counsel gives incorrect advice would give counsel an 
incentive to stay silent “on matters of great importance,” and further it would deny advice on 
deportation to those clients least able to represent themselves, even though such advice is easily 
accessible and available. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1483. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, dismisses Justice Alito’s concerns 
that immigration consequences are frequently unclear and will place too heavy a burden on defense 
counsel. Id. at 1483 n.10. Justice Stevens declared that the “[l]ack of clarity in the law . . . does not 
obviate the need for counsel to say something about the possibility of deportation, even though it will 
affect the scope and nature of counsel’s advice.” Id. 
 65. Id. at 1483 (“This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s 
11
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remanded the case for a finding as to whether the petitioner can 
demonstrate prejudice as a result of his counsel’s deficient 
performance.66 
C. Implications of Padilla v. Kentucky 
By mandating that criminal defense attorneys must inform their 
noncitizen clients of the possibility of deportation before entering 
pleas, the Supreme Court attempted to benefit not only noncitizen 
defendants but the State as well.67 This decision marked a major 
development in upholding noncitizens’ rights to counsel and the 
integrity of pleas.68 However, the Court’s requirement that criminal 
defense attorneys advise clients when the law is clear fails to 
appreciate the dynamic nature of immigration law.69 This places a 
high burden on defense attorneys not only to recognize immigration 
issues but also to give correct advice to their clients.70 The Court’s 
																																																																																																																																
plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively 
mandatory and his counsel’s advice was incorrect.”); see Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 
485 (Ky. 2008) (Cunningham, J., dissenting) (“Counsel who gives erroneous advice to a client which 
influences a felony conviction is worse than no lawyer at all. Common sense dictates that such deficient 
lawyering goes to effectiveness. . . . I do not believe it is too much of a burden to place on our defense 
bar the duty to say, ‘I do not know.”’). 
 66. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487. 
 67. Id. at 1486. (“Counsel who possess the most rudimentary understanding of the deportation 
consequences of a particular criminal offense may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor 
in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a 
conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence.”). 
 68. Supreme Court Upholds Integrity of Criminal Justice System for Immigrants, DEFENDING 
IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://defendingimmigrants.org/news/article.305930-Supreme_Court_Upholds_Integrity_of_Criminal_J
ustice_System_for_Immigrants. Michelle Fei, co-director of the Immigrant Defense Project, commented 
on the Supreme Court’s decision: “We’re thrilled that the Supreme Court has recognized that 
deportation is an extreme penalty and that noncitizens have a constitutional right to legal advice about 
the consequences of pleading guilty.” Id.; see also OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY i (2010) 
(noting that after Padilla, “it is even more important than ever for prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, 
and other interested parties at the federal and local levels to have a basic understanding of the 
immigration consequences that flow from an alien’s guilty plea”). 
 69. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court’s new approach is particularly 
problematic because providing advice on whether a conviction for a particular offense will make an 
alien removable is often quite complex.”); see also Love & Chin, The Right to Counsel, supra note 18, 
at 21 (“The inconsistencies and uncertainties revealed in the passages from the ABA Criminal Lawyer’s 
Guide to Immigration Law quoted by Justice Alito would be hilarious if the subject matter were not so 
deadly serious.”). 
 70. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487–88 (emphasizing that criminal defense attorneys specialize in 
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proposed resolution to the complexity of immigration law—that 
when the law is “unclear or uncertain,” the attorney need only advise 
a client that adverse immigration consequences may follow criminal 
charges—does not provide sufficient guidelines or resources to 
ensure noncitizens receive adequate representation.71 
II. THE DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING PADILLA’S “SUCCINCT AND 
STRAIGHTFORWARD” ANALYSIS TO IMMIGRATION LAW 
The Supreme Court held, in Padilla v. Kentucky, that when 
immigration consequences are “succinct, clear, and explicit” a 
criminal defense attorney has the duty to give correct advice 
regarding removal proceedings.72 The implication of this holding is 
that it binds the criminal defense attorney’s obligation to the 
complexity of the law.73 Justice Alito in his concurrence chastised the 
majority’s approach, calling it a “vague, halfway test.”74 He argued 
that this approach is problematic for many reasons.75 Primarily, he 
noted that a defense attorney cannot always easily ascertain whether 
the law is clear without having an expertise in immigration law.76 
Secondly, he claimed that counsel might mislead defendants by 
																																																																																																																																
criminal proceedings and “it is unrealistic to expect them to provide expert advice on matters that lie 
outside their area of training and experience”); see also Love & Chin, The Right to Counsel, supra note 
18, at 21 (“That the Padilla holding rested squarely on the Sixth Amendment, however, makes clear that 
counsel’s new duty extends to every criminal case—not just the 95 percent that result in guilty pleas, but 
also those that go to trial.”). 
 71. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[I]f defense counsel must provide advice 
regarding only one of the many collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, many defendants are 
likely to be misled.”). 
 72. Id. at 1483. 
 73. Id.; see supra Part I.B. 
 74. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito concurred in the judgment 
because he agreed with the Court that if an attorney misleads a client by giving incorrect advice about 
removal proceedings, the attorney fails to provide effective assistance of counsel under Strickland. Id. 
His opinion differed from the Court’s regarding the attorney’s obligation to his noncitizen client. Id. He 
argued that if an attorney abstains from giving incorrect advice and instead advises a noncitizen that 
immigration consequences may result from a conviction and the client may consult with an immigration 
attorney regarding those consequences, then the attorney satisfies his duty to his client. Id. Under Justice 
Alito’s approach, whether immigration law is clear or unclear, the defense attorney would not need to 
decipher or explain the immigration consequences. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1490–92. 
 76. Id. at 1490 (“How can an attorney who lacks general immigration law expertise be sure that a 
seemingly clear statutory provision actually means what it seems to say when read in isolation?”). 
13
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advising about the risks of deportation because deportation is only 
one of many collateral consequences of a conviction.77 Justice Alito’s 
concurrence highlights the complexity and dynamic nature of 
immigration law and demonstrates the discrepancy between the 
Court’s decision and the actual practice of immigration law.78 While 
the majority appropriately pointed out that determining the 
consequences of Mr. Padilla’s plea merely required reading a statute, 
most investigations into immigration law are not so easy.79 
A. The Complex and Dynamic Nature of Immigration Law 
Immigration law does not merely consist of statutes and 
regulations that a criminal defense attorney can read to easily 
determine the consequences of a plea or conviction.80 Instead, 
immigration law consists of a complex mixture of statutes, policies, 
memos, precedent, administrative decisions, and judicial decisions.81 
Attorneys and their noncitizen clients facing criminal charges must 
be aware of consequences that might result in the clients’ removal.82 
																																																																																																																																
 77. Id. at 1491. Justice Alito also argued that a statute or other administrative reform is a more 
appropriate remedy, and he argued that the majority’s decision usurps Sixth Amendment law. Id. 
 78. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at i–ii. The Office of Immigration Litigation 
(OIL) prepared a monograph in response to the Padilla decision to provide prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and judges with a basic understanding of immigration law. Id. In its preface, the OIL noted 
that it does not provide an in-depth analysis of immigration law because of its complexity and scope. Id. 
It emphasized that “administrative and judicial precedents on immigration matters are far from uniform, 
and determining what precedent to apply might be difficult because the removal proceeding may not be 
completed in the same jurisdiction as the criminal proceeding.” Id. 
 79. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488–89 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 80. Id. at 1488. Justice Alito emphasized the complexity of immigration law due to the fact that 
“‘[m]ost crimes affecting immigration status are not specifically mentioned by the [Immigration and 
Nationality Act], but instead fall under a broad category of crimes, such as crimes involving moral 
turpitude or aggravated felonies.’” Id. (quoting MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & LARRY M. EIG, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 32480, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY summary (2006)). 
 81. RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 1–22 (Stephanie L. Browning ed. 
2006) (“Many immigration provisions created by Congress are inconsistent—be they provisions to 
allow non-American citizens to enter the United States or provisions to effect their removal. 
Immigration Law is a patchwork of promulgations and represents a tide-like shift between 
restrictiveness and openness towards immigrants.”) (footnote omitted). See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 19, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651) 
(“Advising defendants on immigration law in particular can involve complex legal and factual 
questions—ranging from the characterization of an offense for immigration purposes, to naturalization 
questions, to research into an alien defendant’s past immigration status—that are unfamiliar to many 
criminal defense attorneys.”). 
 82. See BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 24. 
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Removal in the immigration context means “the ejection of a person 
from the United States.”83 A noncitizen may face removal either 
through grounds of inadmissibility or deportability.84 A noncitizen 
“seeking admission must overcome the inadmissibility grounds” 
while a noncitizen “who has been admitted faces the deportability 
grounds.”85 Inadmissibility, deportability and their relevant 
provisions are often confused. Even the Office of Immigration 
Litigation,86 which produced a monograph in response to Padilla’s 
holding to aid defense attorneys, prosecutors, and federal and state 
judges, incorrectly stated that a marijuana exception applies to 
grounds of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).87 
This marijuana “exception” applies under the criminal grounds of 
deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).88 The differences 
																																																																																																																																
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. “Inadmissibility” and “deportability” are often confusing because in 1996 Congress passed 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). Id. This act made many 
changes to immigration law, including the procedure for ejecting a person from the United States. Id. 
Before IIRAIRA, noncitizens seeking admission were subject to inadmissibility grounds and went 
before an Immigration Judge at “exclusion hearings.” Id. at 25. Noncitizens who entered the United 
States were subject to deportability grounds at “deportability hearings.” Id. IIRAIRA combined 
exclusion and deportation hearings into “removal hearings” that are for all noncitizens, regardless of 
whether they are seeking admission or the government is trying to eject them following their admission. 
Id. 
 85. BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 25. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 212(a) covers 
inadmissibility grounds, and INA section 237 covers deportability grounds. Id. at 24 n.7. See 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1182, 1227 (2006). Inadmissibility applies to noncitizens who have not been legally admitted to the 
United States, noncitizens who are physically present within the Untied States and want to change 
status, and noncitizens who are returning from a trip abroad. Hendrix & Orza, supra note 40, at 28 
(explaining that a noncitizen returning from a trip abroad is treated as “someone entering the country for 
the first time”). Deportability applies to noncitizens who have been admitted to the United States and are 
later charged with being in the country in violation of the law. MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 56 
(2003). 
 86. The Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) is part of the Department of Justice and is 
responsible for handling and organizing all federal immigration litigation. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
LITIG., supra note 68, preface. The OIL features “experts in interpreting and applying [immigration] 
statutes.” Id. 
 87. RAHA JORJANI, UNIV OF CAL. DAVIS, SCHOOL OF LAW, IMMIGRATION LAW CLINIC, ERRORS IN 
OIL’S 2010 POST-PADILLA REFERENCE GUIDE: “IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY” (2010); see OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 67, at 11. 
 88. Jorjani, supra note 87; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (“Any alien who at any time 
after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or 
regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as 
defined in section 802 of Title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 
30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”). The “petty offense exception” does not exempt the 
15
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between inadmissibility and deportability are significant because the 
consequences for a noncitizen who remains in the United States may 
vary from a noncitizen who has the same conviction but travels 
outside the United States.89 
In addition to analyzing whether a client is subject to grounds of 
inadmissibility and deportability, a criminal defense attorney must 
analyze the conviction to determine “the proper classification of the 
crime.”90 Making this classification is not an easy task. However, it is 
a significant part of a noncitizen’s defense.91 Criminal defense 
attorneys must be able to classify the crime to defend against severe 
immigration consequences such as “guaranteed deportation.”92 
Aggravated felonies and crimes involving moral turpitude are the 
major categories of crimes in immigration law.93 In order for a 
criminal defense attorney to understand and advise a client on the 
immigration consequences, the attorney must initially categorize the 
crime charged so that the attorney can then identify the possible 
adverse consequences, the potential forms of relief, and possible 
solutions for the accused.94 
While crimes involving moral turpitude are listed throughout the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the INA never defines this 
phrase.95 Crimes involving moral turpitude are defined by case law 
and determined on a case-by-case basis unless controlled by clear 
precedent.96 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)97 and other 
																																																																																																																																
noncitizen from deportation but merely permits the noncitizen to apply for a waiver, which is very 
difficult to obtain. See Matter of Almanza-Arenas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 771, 776 (BIA 2009) (finding the fact 
that the noncitizen’s conviction might fall within the petty offense exception to be “irrelevant” and 
denying his application for cancellation of removal). 
 89. KRAMER, supra note 85, at 57 (“A person’s status and personal goals determine whether the 
grounds of inadmissibility, deportability, or both, apply.”). 
 90. Id. at 75. 
 91. Id. 
 92. ROBERT JAMES MCWHIRTER, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION LAW: 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 152 (2d ed., 2006). 
 93. KRAMER, supra note 85, at 75. 
 94. Id. at xxiii. 
 95. Id. at 76. 
 96. Id. 
 97. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is part of the Department of Justice’s Executive Office 
for Immigration Review. BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 154. The BIA reviews removal cases and 
defensive benefit applications decided by Immigration Judges. Id. at 155. 
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courts recognize crimes involving moral turpitude as conduct “that is 
inherently dishonest, base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the 
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to 
society in general.”98 A crime of moral turpitude makes a defendant 
deportable when the potential sentencing term is one year or longer 
and the noncitizen committed the offense within five years of his 
admission to the United States.99 While the definition of crimes 
involving moral turpitude includes crimes such as murder, it also 
lumps crimes such as theft and aggravated assault into the same 
category.100 A permanent resident who pleads no contest to 
aggravated assault for waving a baseball bat and yelling “get out or 
I’ll kill you” at trouble-makers will be deported for committing a 
crime involving moral turpitude on the same grounds as a person 
who attempted murder.101 
The second category of crimes in immigration law is aggravated 
felonies.102 Aggravated felony is a term of art defined statutorily as 
																																																																																																																																
 98. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at 8. Examples of offenses that may constitute 
crimes involving moral turpitude include murder, voluntary manslaughter, theft offenses, forgery, 
kidnapping, mayhem, rape, fraud, spousal abuse, child abuse, and driving under the influence without a 
license. Id. 
 99. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006); OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at 8. A 
noncitizen is inadmissible for committing a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006). OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at 10. The OIL, however, 
again made an error regarding the petty offense exception to inadmissibility: 
The exception applies to offenses for which the maximum possible term of imprisonment 
does not exceed one year. OIL misstates this exception as “for which the maximum 
possible term of imprisonment was less than one year.” This is significant because under 
California law, for example, a misdemeanor where the actual sentence didn’t exceed 6 
months may qualify under the exception because the possible term of imprisonment for a 
California Misdemeanor does not exceed one year. OIL’s error, if relied upon, would 
mistakenly signal to parties that a California misdemeanor conviction cannot be crafted in 
such a way as to fall within the petty offense exception and thereby avoid or mitigate 
certain immigration consequences. 
JORJANI, supra note 87, at 1 (quoting OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at 11). 
 100. See KRAMER, supra note 85, at 76–82. In determining whether a crime is one involving moral 
turpitude, certain offenses should be examined specially. Id. at 78. For example, the BIA has determined 
that theft crimes involve moral turpitude only when a “permanent taking is intended.” Id. (citing V-Z-S, 
22 I. & N. Dec. 1338, 1360 n.12 (B.I.A. 2000)). “[J]oyriding, failure to return a rental car, and similar 
situations that do not involve stealing with an intent to permanently deprive an owner of a property right 
may not—depending on the statute at hand—involve moral turpitude.” Id. 
 101. Id. at xxi, 80. 
 102. BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 49. 
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well as by BIA and federal court decisions.103 The definition, 
however, is only a list of those offenses considered aggravated 
felonies.104 The definition includes offenses such as murder,105 
trafficking of controlled substances,106 money laundering if the 
amount exceeds $10,000,107 and theft or burglary if the term of 
imprisonment is for at least one year.108 The definition is far 
reaching, including offenses that are not felonies under state or 
federal law.109 A conviction for an aggravated felony has serious 
consequences and renders a noncitizen removable at any time.110 
The dynamic nature of crimes of moral turpitude and aggravated 
felonies further complicates their analysis. While criminal defense 
attorneys may be tempted to rely on a prepared list of crimes 
involving moral turpitude or aggravated felonies, they will do so to 
the detriment of their clients.111 The Office of Immigration Litigation 
(OIL) gives a list of offenses that may constitute crimes involving 
moral turpitude, including “driving under the influence without a 
license.”112 This list, however, may mislead attorneys.113 While in the 
Ninth Circuit driving under the influence “with knowledge that the 
driver is prohibited from driving with a suspended or otherwise 
restricted license” is a crime involving moral turpitude, two statutes 
																																																																																																																																
 103. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006); BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 49 n.134. 
 104. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
 105. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). 
 106. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 
 107. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D). 
 108. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). The INA specifies all the various aggravated felony offenses in § 
1101(a)(43)(A–U). 
 109. BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 49 (citing United States v. Marin-Navarette, 244 F.3d 1284 (11th 
Cir. 2001); Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448 (B.I.A. 2002). 
 110. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006); BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 49 (“A person convicted of an 
aggravated felony will not be able to avail him- or herself of a waiver of deportability grounds or relief 
from removal . . . [and] he or she will not later be eligible for re-admission.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) 
(2006)). 
 111. KRAMER, supra note 85, at 75 (“Every client’s case presents a unique set of facts and 
circumstances that must be reviewed in light of both the specific offense conduct and the applicable 
criminal statute involved. . . . Relying on charts, graphs, and other written ‘sound bites’ for the quick 
and easy answer can lead to mistakes in the long run.”); Jorjani, supra note 87 (explaining that the 
definition of a crime involving moral turpitude is “unclear” and warning that one circuit court has called 
the determination of a crime involving moral turpitude “a nebulous question” (citing Ocegueda-Nunez 
v. Holder, 594 F.3d. 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010))). 
 112. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at 8. 
 113. Jorjani, supra note 87. 
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cannot be combined to create an offense that would fit this 
definition.114 Hence in California, a conviction of a simple driving 
under the influence (DUI) and driving without a license—which are 
two separate crimes each without an intent requirement—cannot be 
combined to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.115 
B. Citizenship and Conviction: Words with Special Meaning in 
Immigration Law 
While criminal defense attorneys may feel more comfortable 
working with terms like “citizenship” and “conviction” because they 
are more familiar than terms like “crimes involving moral turpitude” 
and “aggravated felonies”, the concepts all have special meaning in 
immigration law.116 An inquiry into citizenship is vital for criminal 
defense attorneys. If a client is a citizen, the client is not subject to 
grounds of deportability or inadmissibility, and the defense attorney 
can then negotiate for pleas without worrying about the client’s 
immigration status.117 
The majority opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, however, fails to 
establish how far practitioners must go to determine citizenship.118 
While one client’s status “could be easily determined” by looking at 
a birth certificate, the analysis required for other clients may not be 
so “succinct and straightforward.”119 The inquiry into citizenship 
should not end with a determination that the client was born outside 
the United States—a criminal defense attorney must follow up with 
																																																																																																																																
 114. Id. (citing Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)) (“The 
elements of a crime involving moral turpitude must be found in the statute of conviction.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Unfortunately, mistakes concerning citizenship are common, and “[h]undreds of thousands of 
Latino United States citizens were wrongfully deported to Mexico during the last century . . . .” TOOBY, 
supra note 12, at 9; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1489 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“[I]t may be hard, in some cases, for defense counsel even to determine whether a client is an alien.” 
(footnote omitted)); KRAMER, supra note 85, at 1 (“Some people, believe it or not, may be American 
citizens through derivation and not even know it.”). 
 117. KRAMER, supra note 85, at 1. 
 118. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1489–90 (Alito, J., concurring); see also supra note 20 and 
accompanying text. 
 119. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483; BOSWELL, supra note 79, at 176 (“Whether an individual acquired 
citizenship at birth abroad where one or both parents are U.S. citizens is a complex question controlled 
by statute.”). 
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questions about where the client’s parents and grandparents were 
born.120 Attorneys who limit their inquiry into citizenship to easily 
ascertainable means, such as a mere question on an intake sheet, may 
incorrectly advise their client as an immigrant when their client is a 
citizen, or advise their client as a citizen when the client is only a 
legal permanent resident.121 An attorney must therefore seek 
documentation of citizenship.122 
Conviction is another term where the criminal defense attorney’s 
familiarity with the concept may be more harmful than helpful. 
Before an attorney can provide advice on the consequences of an 
action, the attorney must first determine whether an offense 
constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes. However, a state’s 
definition of “conviction” may not match up with the INA’s 
expansive definition of “conviction.”123 Examples of valid 
convictions under the INA include pleas, deferred adjudications, a 
court martial’s entering of guilty judgment, probation before 
judgment, guilty pleas held in abeyance, and all costs that constitute 
																																																																																																																																
 120. BOSWELL, supra note 79, at 176. When a noncitizen is born abroad, the noncitizen may acquire 
citizenship through a U.S. citizen; however, this acquisition depends on the date of the individual’s birth 
and the law at the time of birth. Id. The determination also depends on whether the noncitizen was born 
out of wedlock and for how long the U.S. citizen parent lived in the United States. Id.; see IRA J. 
KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK app. B (12th ed. 2010) (providing multiple 
charts that outline the requirements and laws concerning automatic acquisition of citizenship and tables 
that show the transmission requirements for individuals born abroad, depending on the date of birth). 
 121. See TOOBY, supra note 12, at 8–9. An intake information sheet should reflect a much more 
comprehensive inquiry. Id. at 190–91. Questions should include an inquiry into where the client was 
born; whether the client’s mother is a U.S. citizen and, if so, whether she is a citizen by birth or 
naturalization; and whether the client’s father is a U.S. citizen and, if so, whether he is a citizen by birth 
or naturalization. Id. 
 122. TOOBY, supra note 12, at 8 (“Common documentation of U.S. citizenship includes a birth 
certificate establishing that the client was born in the United States (or a listed possession); a United 
States passport [or] a U.S. Certificate of Citizenship . . . ; a U.S. Certificate of Naturalization . . . or a 
U.S. Citizen Identification Card . . . .”). 
 123. TOOBY, supra note 12, at 48; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2006) (“(A) The term “conviction” means, 
with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of 
guilt has been withheld, where— (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a 
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the 
judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed. 
(B) Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to 
include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any 
suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.”); see, 
e.g., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, app. at C-1. 
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“punishment” or “penalty.”124 A deferred adjudication is when the 
judge sentences a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere but 
does not enforce the sentence at that time.125 If the defendant 
completes requirements such as probation or community service, the 
charges are dismissed; however, for immigration law purposes, even 
if the charges are dismissed the adjudication is still considered a 
conviction.126 The statutory definition of “conviction” does not 
require finality in the normal sense of the word, but instead, finality 
lies at the point where either there is a “formal judgment of guilt” or 
a “sufficient finding of guilt and the imposition of punishment.”127 
Even state convictions vacated for “rehabilitative purposes” remain 
valid convictions for immigration purposes in some circuits.128 
C. Criminal Defense Attorneys in Georgia Post-Padilla 
Despite the complexities of immigration law and determining 
whether an offense constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes 
and the consequences of that conviction, criminal defense attorneys 
in Georgia do not have a wealth of resources. While the majority in 
Padilla v. Kentucky deemed it essential that an attorney advise a 
client as to whether the client’s plea carries a risk of deportation, the 
opinion failed to provide attorneys with the tools to meet this 
																																																																																																																																
 124. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, app. at C-2–C-3; see Hendrix & Orza, supra note 
40, at 28 (“Georgia’s First Offender Statute is a deferred adjudication program. Thus, the INA considers 
a ‘guilty’ plea entered under the First Offender Program to be a conviction.” (citing Ga. Code Ann. § 
42-8-60 (2007))). 
 125. Hendrix & Orza, supra note 40, at 28. 
 126. Id. (“The only instance when a deferred adjudication is not considered a conviction is when the 
sentencing court merely orders the defendant to pay court costs.”). 
 127. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006); see Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 629 
F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2011). In Mejia Rodriguez, a Honduran was denied renewal of temporary protected 
status (TPS) because of two prior offenses. Id. at 1225. He argued that the charges brought in state court 
for marijuana possession and driving with a suspended license did not amount to a “conviction.” Id. The 
Eleventh Circuit disagreed and held that the state court’s acceptance of a plea, its “finding of guilt,” and 
the fact that it “imposed a sentence of time served” constituted a “formal judgment of guilt” and was 
therefore a “conviction.” Id. at 1228. 
 128. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, app. at C-2; see Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 
263, 266 (6th Cir. 2006) (“A conviction vacated for rehabilitative or immigration reasons remains valid 
for immigration purposes, while one vacated because of procedural or substantive infirmities does 
not.”); Ali v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 810–11 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the 
defendant’s conviction was not vacated for procedural or substantive purposes when he mistakenly 
thought a guilty plea under the First Offender Act would constitute an acquittal). 
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obligation.129 Furthermore, the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in 
Smith v. State130 did little to alleviate this burden. In Smith, a 
noncitizen asserted that the trial court violated Georgia Code section 
17-7-93(c) by “failing to advise him on the record” of the possible 
immigration consequences of his plea.131 The court held that a 
noncitizen must establish that “withdrawal is needed to correct a 
manifest injustice” to make a claim against the state for the court’s 
failure.132 The court recognized the burden of informing noncitizens 
of the risk of deportation and emphasized that it was an “unrealistic 
burden” to have the trial court determine “all of the potential 
important consequences of the plea to the particular defendant 
appearing before the court.”133 The court, however, did not claim this 
was an unrealistic burden for defenders. Instead of having trial courts 
share the obligation to inform clients of the adverse immigration 
consequences of a plea, the court declared that Georgia Code section 
17-7-93(c) is a statutory right and the noncitizen’s relief resided in 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.134 
In Georgia, with the growing number of consequences attorneys 
must communicate to their clients and the complex nature of 
immigration law, some defense attorneys may be tempted to rely on 
																																																																																																																																
 129. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1490 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the 
Court’s answer to “the severity of the burden it imposes on defense counsel” is to hinge the obligation 
on the difficulty of determining the consequences). 
 130. Smith v. State, 697 S.E.2d 177 (Ga. 2010). 
 131. Id. at 180. The State conceded that the trial court failed to satisfy Georgia Code Section 17-7-
93(c); however, the court maintained that the noncitizen could not show “manifest injustice” in order to 
withdraw his plea. Id. at 181; see GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-93(c) (2010) (“[T]he court shall determine 
whether the defendant is freely entering the plea with an understanding that if he or she is not a citizen 
of the United States, then the plea may have an impact on his or her immigration status. This subsection 
shall apply with respect to acceptance of any plea of guilty to any state offense in any court of this state 
or any political subdivision of this state.”). 
 132. Smith, 697 S.E.2d at 186. To satisfy a manifest injustice, the noncitizen would have to show “(1) 
that he is not a citizen; (2) that the facts, viewed in conjunction with the immigration laws, show some 
real risk to his immigration status; (3) that no one ever advised him of those risks; and (4) that if he had 
known of the risks, he would have refused to plead guilty and taken his chances at trial.” Id. at 187. 
 133. Id. at 184. 
 134. Id. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court did not mandate extending direct consequences 
to include adverse effects on immigration status and therefore held that the “impact that a guilty plea 
might have on a defendant’s immigration status is a collateral consequence of the plea, so that the trial 
court’s failure to advise a defendant regarding the potential impact does not require that the guilty plea 
be set aside as a matter of constitutional law.” Id. at 184–85. 
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lists of crimes involving moral turpitude or aggravated felonies.135 
However, as the Supreme Court noted in Padilla, with the growing 
severity of immigration law, it is essential that criminal defense 
attorneys at a minimum know how to research the crime in order to 
determine the impact of the offense.136 Otherwise, the Padilla 
holding will fail to ensure “that no criminal defendant—whether a 
citizen or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel’” and 
instead will multiply instances of affirmative misrepresentation.137 
III. PROPOSAL FOR GEORGIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS TO 
UPHOLD PADILLA 
Georgia criminal defense attorneys, to meet the Padilla holding, 
must establish a comprehensive service plan for providing 
representation to noncitizens that includes self-education and actively 
fostering collaborations with immigration attorneys. For public 
defenders with a burdensome caseload, this task will be daunting. 
However, to effectively represent their clients after Padilla, they 
must consider immigration consequences, and comprehensive service 
plans will provide defense attorneys with the most effective tools to 
ease the burden. While statutory relief providing defense attorneys 
with more resources would be ideal, given the current politics of 
immigration, it is not likely that Georgia will pass legislation giving 
defense attorneys funding to represent noncitizens.138 Therefore, 
																																																																																																																																
 135. See Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a failure to advise a 
noncitizen that pleading guilty will require the noncitizen to register as a sex offender “is 
constitutionally deficient performance”). The court relied on the Padilla decision to extend 
representation to informing a client on sex offender registration because “like deportation, registration as 
a sex offender is ‘intimately related to the criminal process’ in that it is an ‘automatic result’ following 
certain criminal convictions.” Id. at 388 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010)); 
Love & Chin, The Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 22. 
 136. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478–80; KRAMER, supra note 85, at 75 (“It is key that the practitioner 
understand how to analyze the elements of a crime and do the research on his or her own, rather than 
rely on a chart or graph to give the quick answer.”). 
 137. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
 138. See Jeremy Redmon, Governor Signs Arizona-Style Immigration Bill into Law, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (May 13, 2011 6:26 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/governor-signs-
arizona-style-944703.html; see also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia 
argued that legislation could have more appropriately resolved the problems of warning of immigration 
consequences rather than the Court’s constitutional holding: 
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defense attorneys will need to take a comprehensive and active 
approach to defending their noncitizen clients. 
Instead of structuring their representation to their clients on 
whether immigration law is “succinct and straightforward,” criminal 
defense attorneys should avoid the Supreme Court’s “vague halfway 
test” altogether.139 Their approach should begin with self-education 
through various manuals and books as well as attending immigration 
defense trainings specifically tailored for criminal defense attorneys. 
Georgia practitioners should couple this foundational understanding 
of immigration law with outside resources such as collaborations 
with immigration attorneys and local nonprofit organizations. 
“Immigration Service Plans” also offer public defenders another 
avenue to ensure that their offices provide effective assistance of 
counsel to noncitizen clients.140 These proposals, while applicable to 
all criminal defense attorneys in Georgia, are tailored to public 
defenders and the challenges of working with limited resources, and 
they aim to help attorneys go beyond the bare minimum requirements 
of Padilla. 
A. Education Through Self-Study and Trainings 
Georgia criminal defense attorneys should use the numerous 
websites and resources online to learn more about their obligations to 
their clients after Padilla. The Immigrant Defense Project and the 
Immigrant Legal Resource Center both have published practice 
advisories for criminal defense lawyers.141 These organizations are 
																																																																																																																																
The Court’s holding prevents legislation that could solve the problem addressed by 
today’s opinions in a more precise and targeted fashion. If the subject had not been 
constitutionalized, legislation could specify which categories of misadvice about matters 
ancillary to the prosecution invalidate plea agreements, what collateral consequences 
counsel must bring to a defendant’s attention, and what warnings must be given. 
Id. 
 139. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring); see discussion supra Part II. 
 140. PETER L. MARKOWITZ, PROTOCOL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER 
IMMIGRATION SERVICE PLAN 6 (2009) (studying various public defender offices and providing various 
components necessary for defenders in representing noncitizen clients). 
 141. KATHERINE BRADY & ANGIE JUNCK, A DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE 
ADVISORY: STEPS TO ADVISING A NONCITIZEN DEFENDANT UNDER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 1 (2010); 
MANUEL D. VARGAS, A DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE ADVISORY: DUTY OF 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL REPRESENTING AN IMMIGRANT DEFENDANT AFTER PADILLA V. 
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partners in the Defending Immigrants Partnership, a collaboration of 
criminal defense and immigrant advocates who have expertise in 
minimizing or avoiding immigration consequences of convictions.142 
These advisories not only highlight the significant points of the 
Padilla decision and the ramifications for defense attorneys, but they 
also provide checklists of immigration consequences for certain 
convictions and explain how practitioners can handle representing 
immigration consequences.143 The Defending Immigrants Partnership 
website includes a sample intake sheet that provides a section for 
noncitizen defendants to state their goals such as “avoid conviction 
that triggers deportation,” “preserve eligibility to obtain future 
immigration benefits,” or “get out of jail ASAP.”144 Georgia defense 
attorneys should use these online resources as a guide to highlight 
relevant immigration issues that will arise during the defense process. 
Defense attorneys must supplement this introduction into 
immigration consequences resulting from criminal dispositions with 
formal training offered by a local bar association. The Southern 
Public Defender Training Center offered a two-day training to new 
public defenders to introduce them to their legal and ethical 
obligations in representing noncitizens.145 The training covered the 
steps public defenders should take to meet Padilla and provided an 
overview of immigration law and drug offenses, property crimes, 
																																																																																																																																
KENTUCKY 1 (2010). 
 142. About the Defending Immigrants Partnership, DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP, 
http://defendingimmigrants.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2010) (“The Partnership offers defender 
programs and individual defense counsel critical resources and training about the immigration 
consequences of crimes, actively encourages and supports development of in-house immigration 
specialists in defender programs, forges connections between local criminal defenders and immigration 
advocates, and provides defenders technical assistance in criminal cases.”). 
 143. VARGAS, supra note 141, at 2–6. 
 144. WASH. DEFENDER ASS’N’S IMMIGRATION PROJECT, SAMPLE INTAKE FOR DEFENDER OFFICE, 
(2010), available at http://www.probono.net/library/attachment.171728. The options for noncitizen 
defendants to choose from when declaring their overall goal of representation are to “avoid conviction 
that triggers deportation,” “preserve eligibility to obtain future immigrations (e.g. LPR status or 
citizenship),” “preserve ability to ask immigration judge to get/keep lawful status [and] stay in U.S.,” 
“get out of jail ASAP,” and “immigration consequences, including deportation are not a priority.” Id. 
 145. Immigration Law Training, DEFENDER CONNECTIONS (The Southern Public Defender Training 
Center, Atlanta, Ga.), Fall 2010, available at http://www.thespdtc.org/uploads/Defender_Connections-
Fall_2010.pdf. The Southern Public Defender Training Center provides new public defenders with 
training to help them better represent their clients. Id. 
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crimes against persons, the definition of conviction for immigration 
purposes, detention, and crime-related immigration laws.146 Other 
local bar associations and organizations offered trainings that cater to 
a broader group of attorneys.147 On November 12, 2010, the 
Immigration Section and Criminal Law Section of the State Bar of 
Georgia co-sponsored training on Immigration Consequences of 
Criminal Activity.148 The training covered definitions of crimes 
involving moral turpitude and aggravated felonies and their 
significance for convictions; the effect of criminal dispositions on 
relief from removal such as waivers and adjustment of status; and 
significant federal and Board of Immigration Appeals cases 
concerning criminal issues and immigration.149 Georgia attorneys 
conducted this training, offering attendees their experience in 
immigration and Georgia law as well as knowledge of the local 
courts and local resources.150 
B. Collaborations: Bringing Immigration and Criminal Defense 
Attorneys Together 
Other states have successfully formed collaborations between their 
public defender offices and local immigration organizations.151 
Several states, such as Colorado and Massachusetts, have a central 
office with immigration experts who provide knowledge and advice 
for various defense attorney offices.152 Many of these experts were 
former public defenders, so they are able to provide information on 
the consequences of convictions with both the immigration and 
																																																																																																																																
 146. Id. The training was conducted by staff from the Immigrant Defense Project. Id. 
 147. See PADILLA CENTRAL: THE CLEARINGHOUSE FOR PADILLA V. KENTUCKY, 
http://www.padillacentral.com/home/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). 
 148. INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. IN GA., IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY PROGRAM MATERIALS (2010) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. Presenters included Marshall Cohen from Cohen & Associates, Carolina Antonini from 
Antonini Law Firm, and Jean C. Sperling from Compano & Sperling. Id. 
 151. Brief of the National Ass’n, supra note 61, at 32–39 (highlighting the successful efforts of states 
and local organizations to provide immigration advice with defender offices either through “ad hoc” 
guidance or through “formal structures”). 
 152. MARKOWITZ, supra note 140, at 12–13. Other offices using a central office to offer immigration 
expertise to various defenders are the New York Legal Aid Society and the Los Angeles County Public 
Defender Office. Id. at 13. 
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criminal systems in mind.153 Another benefit to this system is the low 
cost required to employ the program.154 Other states have in-house 
immigration attorneys to provide immigration advice and expertise to 
defense attorneys as well as clients.155 In-house specialists not only 
enable defense attorneys to ask questions and follow up, but also 
provide offices the opportunity to incorporate immigration issues into 
the everyday routine.156 
A different option for offices on a more local level is to contract 
with immigration advocacy organizations to handle the immigration 
issues that arise during the defense process. The California State 
Public Defender contracts with the Immigrant Legal Resource 
Center, an organization that has expertise in the defense of 
noncitizens, paying for only as much immigration advice as it 
needs.157 However, a limitation of contracting with immigration 
experts for advice is that they do not provide direct client services.158 
For an office that wants to ensure its clients have direct access to 
immigration expertise, it could implement a system where it shares 
an immigration attorney with a local service provider.159 The 
Defender Association of Philadelphia employs this system that not 
only allows direct access, but additionally fosters cooperation and 
education between immigration and criminal defense attorneys.160 
Criminal defense attorneys in Georgia should look to these models 
and choose a system that caters to the needs of their offices. In the 
Atlanta area there are two main nonprofit organizations that offer 
immigration services for low-income clients: Catholic Charities 
Atlanta and the Latin American Association.161 These organizations 
																																																																																																																																
 153. Id. at 13. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 10–11. Offices that use in-house immigration experts include the Bronx Defenders, 
Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Public Defender 
Service for the District of Columbia, and the Monroe County Public Defenders Office. Id. 
 156. Id. at 10. 
 157. Id. at 14. 
 158. MARKOWITZ, supra note 140, at 14. 
 159. Id. at 11–12. 
 160. Id. at 12. 
 161. Immigration Legal Services, CATHOLIC CHARITIES ATLANTA, 
http://www.catholiccharitiesatlanta.org/services/immigration-legal-services/immigration-legal-services/ 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011); Immigration Services Offered by the Latin American Association, LATIN 
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offer services such as helping clients obtain legal status, assisting 
clients in naturalization, and legal representation in removal 
defense.162 Criminal defense attorneys can reach out to these 
organizations to foster collaboration. Additionally, offices can 
contact the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) to 
connect to other immigration attorneys in Georgia.163 Through one of 
these options, criminal defense attorneys in Georgia should be able to 
mirror the success of partnerships in other states and provide their 
noncitizen clients with immigration advice. 
C. Immigration Service Plans 
“Immigration Service Plans” is a term describing the various 
approaches public defender offices can take to provide their 
noncitizen clients with effective representation.164 There are five 
components to an Immigration Service Plan: an advice component, 
an information-gathering component, a language access component, 
a staff development component, and a direct immigration service or 
referral component.165 Defender offices can choose certain 
components depending on their funding and create a service plan that 
will help alleviate the burden for individual defense attorneys, thus 




ang=en (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). 
 162. Immigration Services Offered by the Latin American Association, LATIN AM. ASS’N, 
http://www.thelaa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61&Itemid=83&lang=en (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2010). To reach the Latin American Association, call (404) 471-1889. Immigration 
Legal Services, CATHOLIC CHARITIES ATLANTA, 
http://www.catholiccharitiesatlanta.org/services/immigration-legal-services/immigration-legal-services/ 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011). Catholic Charities specializes in helping victims of domestic violence, 
neglected foreign children, detained immigrants, and victims of crimes and trafficking. Id. To reach the 
Immigration Legal Services department, call (404) 885-7454. Id. 
 163. AILA INFONET, http://www.aila.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). The American Immigration 
Law Association website has a feature called “Find a Lawyer,” where defense attorneys can search for 
immigration lawyers based on location and the type of advice needed on topics such as adoption, 
employer sanctions, and student visas. Id. 
 164. MARKOWITZ, supra note 140, at 6–7. 
 165. Id. at 2. 
 166. Id. at 6–7. The Immigrant Defense Project and New York State Defenders Association surveyed 
leading public defenders offices throughout the country about the approaches they take to providing 
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The Immigration Service Plan components break down the issues 
defender offices should focus on when representing noncitizen 
clients. First, defender offices must decide how to advise their clients 
on immigration consequences of criminal activity through one of the 
collaboration options discussed above.167 Second, offices must 
consider how to collect information from noncitizens about their 
immigration status, how to convey this information to immigration 
experts, and how to store this information within the office.168 Third, 
public defender offices must determine how to handle language 
barriers. Options include using family members as interpreters, 
having bilingual staff members, providing document translation, and 
using language services in court.169 Fourth, offices must not only 
train their defenders, but also keep them updated on current 
immigration law and practice techniques.170 Finally, defender offices 
should make sure clients have access to immigration services when 
adjusting immigration status or when facing removal proceedings.171 
Otherwise offices “invest the time, energy, and resources into 
developing an Immigration Service Plan but then do nothing to 
ensure that the office’s hard work at mitigating immigration 
consequences bears real fruit when a client actually faces federal 
immigration authorities.”172 An office that adopts an Immigration 
Service Plan will give its defenders the necessary tools and resources 
to represent noncitizen clients and eliminate the temptation to only do 
the bare minimum under Padilla. 
While offices may recognize the need for an Immigration Service 
Plan, implementing it may be a struggle. In Georgia, offices should 
start with surveying the noncitizen population in their city or county 
to determine the need and then identify the possible funding sources 
																																																																																																																																
immigration advice. Id. at 1. They created this protocol to aid defenders in meeting the challenges of 
representing noncitizens. Id. 
 167. Id. at 6; see supra Part III.B. 
 168. MARKOWITZ, supra note 140, at 20. 
 169. Id. at 23–25. 
 170. Id. at 22. 
 171. Id. at 26. 
 172. Id. 
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they may use to meet this need.173 While the state or county might be 
the most logical source of funding, some offices will be unable to 
generate enough resources to meet the needs of their noncitizen 
clients. These offices can look to other resources such as 
postgraduate fellowships, grants, or fundraising.174 Another option 
for offices is to phase in the Immigration Service Plan so the office 
has time to obtain funding.175 While implementing the program may 
meet challenges, public defender offices should emphasize that they 
can only meet the Padilla holding through a comprehensive service 
plan. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Padilla put a significant burden on criminal 
defense attorneys when it ruled that noncitizen clients have a claim to 
ineffective assistance of counsel when defense attorneys fail to 
advise of or affirmatively misrepresent to their clients the 
immigration consequences of criminal activity.176 However, given 
the severity of immigration law, this holding was necessary to protect 
the noncitizen’s Sixth Amendment right.177 Immigration law is 
complex, requiring more than just reading a statute. Criminal defense 
attorneys will need to learn not only the vocabulary, but also how to 
classify the crimes and analyze the possible consequences.178 
Criminal defense attorneys can meet the challenge posed by Padilla 
and the complexity of immigration law by educating themselves and 
fostering collaborations with immigration attorneys. As the 
connection between criminal and immigration law grows stronger, 
these relationships will be essential in representing noncitizen 
clients.179 Defenders must step up to the Padilla holding with a 
determination to effectively represent their clients. 
																																																																																																																																
 173. Id. at 28–29. 
 174. MARKOWITZ, supra note 140, at 29. 
 175. Id. at 30. 
 176. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 177. Id. at 1486. 
 178. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 179. KRAMER, supra note 85, at xxiii (“Today, the bond between immigration and criminal law is 
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more significant than ever before, [and] [a]s the immigration population grows larger in the United 
States, the criminal-alien provisions of the law grow harsher.”). 
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